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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\\'l·~~TJ4~HN CONTRACTING 
COHPORATION (Employer) 
and~~~~ PLOYE~RS MUTUAL 
LIABILITY INSURANCE 
CO~lPAi\Y OF WISCONSIN, 
(Carrier), 
Plaintiffs, 
-\'H.-
I ~DUSTRL\L COl\fl\USSION OF 
UT~\II and LEO A. DAVIS, 
Defendants. 
Case 
No. 9970 
PLAINTIF'FS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a review of a decision of the Industrial Com-
mission of Utah granting to defendant Leo A. Davis 
compensation for permanent partial disability under the 
provisions of Section 35-1-66 Utah Code Annotated 1953 
as amended. The Commission granted compensation for 
100 weeks, the period prescribed by the statutory sched-
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ule for total loss of function of one eye. The questions 
presented on appeal relate to the propriety of that award 
on the facts in this case. 
STATE1IENT OF FACTS 
The facts are stipulated. Defendant Leo A. Davis 
injured his right eye in an industrial accident. The in-
jury is such that, without a corrective optical lens, the 
right eye is essentially blind. Approximately 50% of the 
eye's function is restored by the use of glasses. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Commission awarded defendant Leo A. Davis 
compensation for total blindness of one eye in accord-
ance with the schedule incorporated in Section 35-1-66 
(100 weeks). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek an order of this court declaring that 
the Industrial Commission improperly assessed the dis-
ability under the statute, and that the loss of visual func-
tion should be assessed on a binocular basis with 
correction. 
ARGUMENT 
TOTAL BLINDNESS OF AN EYE HAS NOT 
OCCURRED IF SUBSTANTIAL FUNCTION 
CAN BE RESTORED BY THE USE OF OPTI-
CAL AIDS. 
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'rhe Utah .Aet is silent as to the recognition which 
should ht> given to the faet that some kinds of sense im-
pnirment ean be greatly ameliorated by the use of appli-
am·t•s commonly prescribed by physicians and in general 
use in our society. 
The difference 1n disabling effect between a cor-
rectible and an inrorretible impairment of vision is so 
mnnifl'st in our every-day experience, however, that we 
can hardly assume the legislature intended the two kinds 
ot' impairment to be equally compensable. The basic 
premise of the compensation laws is that industry should 
provide a substitute for lost earning power. The need to 
wear g-lasses does not, in our society, put a workman at 
appreciable disadvantage in the labor market, but a vis-
ual deficiency which cannot be restored by glasses clear-
ly disqualifies him for many types of employment. 
The Utah Act has, from the beginning, given rec-
ognition to the importance of prosthesis in reducing dis-
ability. Where industrial injury results in the loss of a 
lt>g-, for instance, a substantially lesser award is pro-
vided where the stump is sufficient to permit the use 
of an artificial leg (Sec. 35-1-66). It appears to be the 
position of the Commission that, since the Legislature 
failed to make similar provision for monocular blindness 
where the mechanism of the eye can be restored to func-
tion by a lens, it is the legislative mandate that compen-
sation be awarded for this impairment without reference 
to correctibility. 
"~ e believe the Commission erred In equating the 
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loss of function in this case with the kinds of losses whieh 
the schedule really treats. Compensation is awarded for 
loss of an arm, for instance, only if the arm is amputated 
or rendered useless. If an arm, otherwise useless, can be 
restored to function by the insertion or a pin or plate, 
compensation is awarded only upon an appraisal of the 
disability after the appropriate orthopedic procedure has 
been completed. While the inserted metal part may take 
the place of a section of bone or joint, it is not considered 
that the arm restored to function by the insertion is an 
artificial arm. 
The analogy between an arm so restored to use and 
an eye restored to use by a lens would appear to be a 
valid one. In each case, it is the injured anatomical 
member which is made to function, not an artificial sub-
stitute for it. It is not generally considered that a man 
who can see only with glasses is blind any more than it 
is considered that a man who can walk only because of a 
pin in his hip is paraplegic. The legislature did not spe-
cifically provide for the situation where monocular blind-
ness can be relieved by a lens simply because that kind 
of blindness is not blindness, in the popular concept, 
at all. 
The view that visual impairment should be evaluated 
on a corrected basis is the one taken by almost every 
court which has considered the problem. Schneider's 
statement of the legal proposition is this: 
''Where an injured eye is, with the aid of a proper 
glass, nearly normal for many purposes, it does 
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not amount to the loss of an eye, even though it 
is undisputed that there is permanent impairment 
of the vision of the eye as the result of the 
injury''' 
and the Pd i tors of American Juris prudence say: 
''Although there is some authority to the contrary, 
according to most authorities, the extent of the 
impairment of vision will be determined in view 
of the use of glasses or such other corrective 
means as are practicable; in other words, the ex-
tent of loss of vision due to an injury may be com-
puted on the basis of the pre-injury vision as cor-
rected by glasses. ''2 
This subject has been frequently annotated (8 ALR 
1330; 7:~ ALR 716; 99 ALR 1507; 142 ALR 832) and 
there is no dearth of judicial expression on the point 
which concerns us. The case most frequently cited in 
later decisions (and one which seems on all fours with 
the instant case) is Washington Terminal Co. v. Hoage, 
et al., 79 F2d 158, heard by the Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia in 1935. In that case, the 
injured employee demonstrated a 100% loss of vision of 
the left eye and a 25% loss of vision of his right eye. 
There being no evidence before the deputy commissioner 
as to the remedial effect of glasses, he made findings of 
disability without corrction. The employee, having re-
ceived compensation for the 100% left eye and 25% right 
llye impairment, then consulted an occulist who pre-
1 ~m. R. Schneider, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, Second Edi-
bOn. Volume II, Section 409. p. 1385. 
: 58 Am Jur 785 
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scribed glasses which restored the vision of the right eyp 
almost completely and the left eye to 50% efficiency. 
The act under which benefits were sought included a 
schedule, much like the Utah schedule, which provided: 
" ( 5) Eye lost, 140 weeks compensation . . . ( 16) 
Compensation for loss of ... 80% or more of the 
vision of the eye shall be the same as for loss of 
eye.'' 
The employer applied for relief from the original 
award on the basis of the changed condition. In reversing 
the denial of relief by the trial court, the Circuit Court 
said: 
''In our opinion this decision was erroneous 
for the reason that the deputy commissioner, 
when passing upon the extent of Poff's vision, 
should not have excluded from consideration the 
assistance ·which he could receive from the use of 
glasses. 
The use of eyeglasses as an aid to vision is so 
commonly understood and employed that no per-
son would be considered as having lost 80 per cent 
of normal Yision if at the same time by the use of 
glasses he would possess 50 per cent of normal 
VISIOn. Therefore, according to the reasonable 
construction of the statute, it should be held that 
one possessing 50 per cent efficiency of vision in 
an injured eye when using glasses cannot be clas-
sified as having lost the use of 80% of the vision 
of such eye. 
It must be remembered that the award payable 
to the employee under the statute is for '' disabil-
ity" which means incapacity because of injury to 
earn the wages which the employee was receiving 
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at t lH· time of injury in thP ~nnw or any other em-
ployment (~Pet ion :.!, ~nbsec. 10 of the act, 33 
l'SC.\ § !Hl:! (10). The intention of the lnw is to 
provide compensation for loss or disability in 
earning power and not indemnity or damages for 
injury to a member of the hody. It is consistent 
with the purpose of that act that the disability of 
an employee resulting from an injury to his eyes 
should be considered with reference to the benefit 
resulting from the use of glasses." 
\Yhenever there has been deviation from the princi-
ple expn·s~ed in the Washington Terminal case, it has 
been explained on the basis of some peculiar phrasing of 
the ~tatute under which benefits are to be paid which 
will not permit a construction in accordance with com-
mon sPllsl'. There is no such peculiar phrasing of the 
rtah .\ct. The schedule, so far as it relates to eye in-
jurit>s, reads as follows : 
''One eye by enucleation ____________ 120 weeks 
Total blindness of one eye ________ 100 weeks'' 
This language is entirely susceptible to the construc-
tion that the fact of blindness vel non will be determined 
on a corrected basis. This court has had only one pre-
\inu:-: oecasion to rule on this point, and it held squarely 
"ith the authorities we have cited above. In the 1921 
l'HSl' of Jloray v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah 404; 
199 Pac. 1023, this court considered a claim of an em-
ployee for benefits for loss of visual function. Begin-
lung at page 416 of the Utah Reporter, the court cited 
with approval the opinion of the Supreme Court of Mich-
igan in the case of Cline v. Studebaker Corporation, 189 
:Mich. 51!; 155 X'V 519, where that court said: 
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''It is unnecessary to determine whether the 
loss of 90% of the sight is substantially the loss of 
the eye, because that is not the present case. 
Ninety percent of the sight is not lost when. it c01n 
be diminished to 50% by use of common. appli-
ances. And it is the duty of the sufferer to mini-
mize the injury as much as he reasonably may." 
(emphasis added) 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the Industrial Commission in this case 
that benefits be paid for impairment of vision on an un-
corrected basis is out of harmony with compensation 
philosophy and the specific pronouncements of this Court. 
The decision should be voided by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT 
By FRANK J. ALLEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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